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TOWARDS A WARLESS WORLD: ONE LEGAL FORMULA
TO ACHIEVE TRANSITION
RICHARD A. FALKt & SAUL H. MENDLOVITZ$
I. FRoMx A WAR SYSTEMf TO A PEACE SYSTEI IN THE CONTEIPORARY WORLD
It is possible for jurists to work meaningfully towards the creation of a
warless world-a world in which nations have neither the instruments nor
the inclination to resolve their disputes by recourse to force. Creative theorizing
in the recent literature of international relations ' has deepened our under-
standing of the central events in the international arena. Such theorizing
continues to have its influence upon officials entrusted with the formation of
defense and foreign policy.2 Systems analysis, game theory, conflict resolution
studies, operations research, content analysis, and equilibrium approaches have
emerged to supplement, if not supplant the stock repertory of the theorist
of world affairs: power politics, historical exposition and national interest.3
This article is concerned with one crucial focus for future investigation by
these diverse methodologies-what are the techniques that could most effec-
tively be used to shift the pattern of inter-state relations from a dominantly
threat and war system to a dominantly reconciliation and peace system ?4 In
tAssociate Professor of International Law, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs; Associate Professor, Princeton University.
$Professor of Law, Law School, Rutgers University.
1. A particularly useful survey of contemporary theorizing is INTERNATIONAL.
POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY; A READER IN RESEARCH AND THEORY (Rosenan ed. 1961).
See also CONTEMPORARY THEORY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Hoffmann ed. 1960);
THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM, THEORETICAL ESSAYS (Knorr & Verba ed. 1961).
2. For a popular presentation of this influence see Kraft, War Thinkers, Esquire,
Sept. 1962, p. 102.
3. Among the many works that have had this effect are KAPLAN, SYSTEM AND PRO-
CESS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1957) ; RAPOPORT, FIGHTS, GAmES, AND DEBATES
(1960); SCHELLNG, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960); SNYDER, DETERRENCE AND
DEFENSE (1961); BOULDING, CONFLICT AND DEFENSE (1962); DEcISION-MAXING AS AN
APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (Snyder, Bruck & Sapin eds. 1962) ;
LISLA, INTERNATIONAL Egui~imuu (1957); McDOUGAL & ASSOCIATES, STUIES IN
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1960); McDouGAL & FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER (1961) ; McDOUGAL & BURE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS (1962) ;
VIssCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Corbett transl. 1957).
4. This question highlights the quest for a political response that is adequate to cope
with the widely perceived need "to do something" about the advent of nuclear technology.
The prevailing interpretation of the imperative "do something" is very disappointing in
view of the dangers of nuclear war. By asking the transition question we imply that to
do something means to conceive and work toward a system change. This way of putting
the issue states the order of magnitude of the challenge. It can not be met by reformist
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the past, efforts to answer this question have failed to take account of the
strong grip of present actualities upon human and national behavior. How to
acknowledge reality and yet encourage movement towards a better future
is the challenging problem which prompts our focus upon transition 5 tech-
niques in the effort to establish a warless world. The present situation makes
it clear that thermonuclear war is capable of producing unprecedented and
irreparable disaster, mutilating the achievements of centuries. Consequently, a
premium is to be placed upon the avoidance of any situation with a high
potentiality for escalation into a cold war crisis. But almost any use of armed
force between states and even some uses of armed force within states contains
dangers of thermonuclear escalation.6 In this context, every possibility for
initiating the process of transition from a war system to a peace system must
be explored.7
There is a growing literature on how a warless world would operate, if one
is created, despite the persistence of hostility and conflict.8 The project of
achieving a warless world has been withdrawn from the realm of fancy. The
fabric of domestic and international society which supports the war-system
has now become a prominent focus for investigation. 9 This new concern ac-
knowledges the fact that previously too little attention has been given to the
political and social implications of the abolition of war, and too little thinking
has been done about establishing noncoercive means for achieving fundamental
thinking, although perhaps the dangers can be reduced and postponed. No solution strikes
us as responsive that does not reorganize power in such a way that wars and their threat
by nation against nation are no longer a characteristic mode of interaction between the
basic political units in world affairs, whether this unit is a bloc, a region, or a nation.
5. We wish to stress the focus intended by the word "transition." This means a fun-
damental reorganization of power and value by the movement from one system to another.
The notion is succinctly expressed in Boulding, The Prevention of World War III, 38
VA. L. R v. 1 (1962).
6. This altered pattern for violent conflict in world politics applies particularly to
the relations of the nuclear powers. Interstate aggression may still be tenable as a way
for secondary states to expand; witness, for example, the conduct of China, India (Goa),
and Indonesia. For a general study of the role of law in this altered environment, see
Falk, Janus Tormented: The International Law of Internal War, in THE INTERNATIONAL
ASPECTS OF CIVIL STRIFE (Rosenau ed., to be published).
7. The solution of the transition problem requires us to abandon the existing system
for the management of political power and authority and to replace it with a new system
based on a new organizing principle. Theodicy and the rule of philosopher kings were
favorite solutions of the classical formulation of the transition problem in Western culture.
The quest for transition is not new. See DANTE, DE MoNARcHiA (Schreider tr. 1949).
8. For a group of essays dealing with facets of these problems, see BREAKTHROUGH
TO PEACE (1962). See also LEGAL AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF WORLD ORDER (Mendlovitz
ed. 1962); CLARK & SOHN, WORLD PEACE THROUGH WORLD LAW (2nd rev. ed. Clark
1960); MILLIS, PERMANENT PEACE (1961); MILlIS, A WORLD WITHOUT WAR (1961);
Millis, Order and Change in a Warless World, Saturday Review, Sept. 15, 1962, p. 18;
PREVENTING WORLD WAR III (Deutch, Evan & Wright eds. 1962).
9. This is one contribution that has been definitely made by Herman Kahn's general
agitation for more thinking about these "unthinkable" problems. See KAHN, THINKING
ABOUT THE UNTHINKABLE (1962).
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changes in a relatively unstructured social system, especially one which lacks
an effective and regularly available institution that behaves like a legislative
organ.10
In exploring what steps might be taken to modify or even eliminate the
massive and yet delicately geared foundation that underlies the war-supporting
structure, our concentration on the role to be taken by legal institutions and
processes in a transition program is prompted by three general considerations.
First, since an announced goal of the United States government is the estab-
lishment of peaceful world under law,1 it seems appropriate to consider its
feasibility and to identify the more promising areas for movement toward it.
Second, writers in international law have long provided many of the major
concepts that statesmen and decision-makers use to rationalize or construct
international order.'2 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, whether one
considers law as the primary agent or as the product of other social forces, it
is clear that legal institutions and processes interact in significant fashion with
all important institutions and processes of organized society. The legal order
thus serves as a realistic prism for an investigation of the transition problem.
Our concern with a partial analysis of the contributions that legal method
and institutions might make to the solution of the transition problems makes
it necessary first to depict the wider context of world affairs within which
law must operate, and then to touch upon a variety of approaches to transition
that might be undertaken, either separately or simultaneously.
II. TiaE CONTEXT - LEGAL AND SOCIAL
Until recently, most respected jurists concerned with international law
concentrated their attention upon the role and content of legal doctrine
posited by formal lawmaking sources.'3 The jurist usually was eager to de-
10. By legislative is meant the competence to generate new norms and abandon old
ones to accord with shifts in social policy. The pressure for new norms, if it once is
perceived as ascendant, endangers the peace of the community unless it can be satisfied.
Thus it is a serious deficiency of the existing international order that it lacks a regularly
operating legislative organ, especially in a period in which there is so much attention
devoted to the elimination of violence from the conduct of international relations.
11. See, e.g., President Eisenhower's 1959 New Delhi speech, Single Rule of Law, in
PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: DWIGHT D. EIsENHowER
1959, 826-32 (1959) ; and a proclamation by President Kennedy, Law Day, U.S.A.-1963,
48 DEP'T STATE BULL. 297 (1963).
12. See, e.g., Meeker, Role of Law in Political Aspects of World Affairs, 48 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 83 (1963).
13. Hence, traditional writing was quite absorbed by a discussion of rules of inter-
national law widely accepted by domestic legal orders. The extent to which the concern
with sources has vanished from contemporary approaches is highlighted by the work of
Myres S. McDougal. See, e.g., McDOUGAL & BnumE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OC.NS
(1962), where the processes associated with claims and authoritative decisions are per-
ceived as the essential constituents of the international legal system. Good jurisprudential
discussions are to be found in Gihl, The Legal Character and Sources of International
Law, in SCANDINAVIAN STuias nT LAW 51-92 (1957); cf. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
208-31 (1961).
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scribe accurately and arrange logically the corpus of rules available to govern
the conduct of states. The appropriateness of these scholarly emphases has
been challenged because it has become increasingly evident to observers of
the international scene that an understanding of legal rules depends heavily
upon an awareness of the social context within which these rules are expected
to function. This has persuaded some contemporary observers to insist that
international law be understood in the light of the distinctive qualities pos-
sessed by existing patterns 14 of international order. Among the most evident
of these qualities is the decentralized distribution of power among national
actors and the tendency of nations to make selfish use of their power even
in the face of limiting rules.15 This datum has led the so-called "realist
school"'16 to assign a trivial role to law in international affairs, belittling law
as pretentious and distracting rhetoric, and discounting claims that it can
restrain the behavior of nations. The clash of antagonistic social orders and
the arrival on the international stage of newly independent anti-colonial na-
tions with diverse political and cultural outlooks has reinforced this negative
attitude.
But even if this attitude is extreme, it cannot be doubted that the develop-
ment of nuclear weapons has radically altered the climate within which
international law exists. Nuclear weapons make manifest the catastrophic
dangers of general war. As well, nations without significant nuclear capacity
have been relegated to positions of relatively insignificant influence. Further,
nuclear technology has radically undermined the state as the basic organizing
unit of international affairs. The state succeeded as a mode of political organi-
zation because it, and it alone, could provide a society with security against
external aggression. Now, with the possible exception of the nuclear super-
powers, the state has ceased to be a suitable unit for the arrangement of na-
tional security.' 7 Regional security systems are coming to replace national
14. "Patterns" rather than "pattern" is a deliberate choice. It signals the pluralism
of legal order on the system level and points to the relevance of sub-systems-for instance,
regional, inter-governmental, and functional networks of legal rights, duties, and insti-
tutions.
15. See CoRBETr, LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE RELATIONS OF STATES 3-89 (1951);
VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Corbett transl. 1957).
16. The label "realist school" has been used in the literature of international relations
to refer to such writers as Hans Morgenthau and George Kennan. Their work arose as
a reaction to such tendencies as the formalism of Hans Kelsen, the legalism of Quincy
Wright, and the moralism of Woodrow Wilson. In contrast, these "realists" sought to
emphasize power as the real determinant of international relations, deprecating the rele-
vance of law and morals for understanding or policy. Myres McDougal might be classified
as a post-realist for he takes into account the relevance of law and morals ("values") to
the study of world affairs. McDougal's great contribution is to revive the study of law
as an instrument for understanding any social phenomena. See, e.g., McDougal, Some
Basic Theoretical Concepts About International Law: A Policy-Oriented Framework of
Inquiry, 4 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 337 (1960).
17. This position is fully developed in HERZ, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN THE ATOMC
AGE (1959). For a shorter statement see Herz, Rise and Demise of the Territorial State,
9 WORLD POLrrcs 473 (1957).
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defense systems. Finally, the advent of the nuclear threat has tended to shift
the arenas of inter-bloc violence to areas far removed from the vital centers
of bloc potency. Asia, now Africa, and soon perhaps Latin America, are
chosen as the locales for the most intensive international conflicts at the stra-
tegic level.
These developments suggest that a general consensus about peaceful ob-
jectives should not be allowed to obscure the fact that there are many reasons
to be pessimistic about the prospects for achieving and implementing agree-
ments among the elites of major powers as to the means of transition. Al-
though stalemating arrangements, designed to foreclose military confronta-
tions with high escalation potentials are quite negotiable (especially outside
of Europe),18 major efforts to give structure to joint undertakings such as
disarmament or compulsory processes for pacific settlement of international
disputes are not making, nor are they about to make, encouraging progress.
The West refuses to accept any institutional arrangement which does not in-
lude provision for adjudicative and sanctioning processes that are roughly
analogous to those that operate in its major domestic societies. In addition,
the United States appears to feel that its tradition of respect for law places
it at a comparative disadvantage in the cold war, given Communist contempt
in theory and practice for the claims of law. Thus the serious acceptance of
a legal regime governing vital relations would appear to bind the West while
leaving the Sino-Soviet powers free to violate inconvenient obligations.19 Cer-
tainly Communist ideology has made rather short shrift of the restraining
claims of law, and Soviet and Chinese leaders have seemed uninhibited by
adverse determinations in the United Nations with respect to Korea, Hungary,
Tibet, the 1961 atmospheric nuclear test series, or the non-aggressipn pacts
that were supposed to have guaranteed the autonomy of the Baltic states.
The United States, however, has also demonstrated an unwillingness to
constrain its behavior in accord with applicable law 2o-witness, for instance,
18. E.g., Korea, Geneva Accords of 1954, and Laos neutrality protocol of 1962. For a
richly documented study of the settlement of international disputes see Modelski, Interna-
tional Settlement of Internal War, in INTERNATIONAL AsPEcTs OF CIVIL STRIFE (Rosenau
ed., to be published).
19. The Soviet Union has indicated an official willingness to comply with the inter-
national legal obligations which it has explicitly and specifically undertaken. See the text-
book used by the Institute of Law of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1957 INTR-
NATIONAL LAw 282; and Tunkin, Co-Existence and International Law, 95 REcuE. DES
CouRs 1 (1958). Of course, the pledge to comply is quite distinct from patterns of com-
pliance when the political pressures to violate grow strong. The United States has violated
applicable legal rules under circumstances of similar cold war pressure. See Falk, Ameri-
can Intervention in Cuba and the Rule of Law, 22 Ouio ST. L.J. 546 (1961).
20. By applicable law is meant the relevant restraining limits upon national behavior
as they are construed by an impartial observer. There are obvious difficulties here. Disa-
greements will arise about the identity and qualifications of an impartial observer. It is
quite probable that impartial observers, however designated, will disagree about the re-
straints that are applicable to national behavior in a particular situation. Nevertheless, the
idea of applicable law is useful to suggest that there is some common basis upon which
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its participation in the Guatemalan anti-Arbenz uprising, the Suez, Lebanon
and U-2 incidents, and its support of the Bay of Pigs invasion. A more
symmetrical disregard for law exists on the part of cold war rivals (at least on
the level of practice) than is generally conceded in the West. It should be
noted that a decentralized legal system can hardly expect to solicit the com-
pliance of major participants on crucial issues when the atmosphere is domi-
nated by conflict and distrust. Law is an energy that informs a quest for
order, but it is dependent on the convergence of ethical, political, and social
ordering energies to provide an infra-structure of community support. With
a sense of this extra-legal context in mind, it seems sensible to make claims
modest when discussing the autonomous role of law as a means to promote
transition and hasten the acceptance of a warless world.21
The role of law in this kind of world is not readily apparent. Within a
modern national society we rely upon institutions of control and change to
reconcile social forces in conflict. Centralized institutions are automatically,
if problematically, called upon to act. But the situation is radically different
if the social order in question lacks adequate central institutions. How can a
decentralized legal system contribute to the dissolution of fundamental tension
and hostility? The challenge of this question influences our consideration of
the variety of approaches that might be taken to the transition question.
III. EXISTING APPROACHES TO TRANSITION
In order of increasing generality, it might be said that there are five
existing approaches to the transition question. Some political crises can be
solved within the existing system of international order by drawing upon
the arsenal of available ad hoc techniques without altering existing institu-
tions or developing new ones. These crises can be identified and classified.
Many are primarily consequences and reflections of cold war tensions. Their
importance derives largely from the fact that they have been accepted as
symbols of the conflict between the major powers. Solutions need not be
achieved within a framework of futuristic all-encompassing settlement. They
can be reached without the permanent routinization of dispute settlement and
conflict-prevention machinery. Cuban-American relations, the status of Com-
munist China, the controversies over control of Korea, Laos, and Vietnam
are illustrative. Adopting this kind of category does not imply that policy-
makers should be discouraged from using the occasions of settlement as op-
to make distinctions between legal and illegal conduct; if this common basis is denied, then
it is tantamount to a confession that there is no acceptable way to identify a violation.
Legal scholars have, it is contended, an important responsibility to seek for objectivity of
outlook and to serve the world community as a panel of impartial observers. The notion
of "applicability" is useful to emphasize the connection that must be made between rule
and act implying the intervention of human judgment.
21. Law contributes rules, institutions, and procedures for making the transition and
for stabilizing it once made; thus, it moves us toward the end-in-view and helps to sustain
it should it ever come into being. However, the fundamental commitments are social and
political; without these the efforts of jurists are vain futilities.
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portunities to establish more enduring forms of conflict-resolving machinery.
But it is clear that certain issues demand peculiarly contextual solutions be-
cause the history of their development combines with the present framework
of distrust to preclude any other approach to decision-making. The inter-
national atmosphere is so inflamed by the failure to resolve these issues that
settlement is required before we can expect to promote the effective growth
of a centralized legal structure.2 -
Another technique for approaching the transition question involves the
narrowing of the economic disparity between consumer-industrialized societies
and the newly-developing societies. Different governments are able to tolerate
different disparities in wealth among the area and population in regions under
their control. A recent study suggests that ordinarily a nation can not stand
more than a ratio of three to one between its richest and poorest sections.23
In a decentralized authority structure having almost instantaneous communi-
cation and very rapid transportation of men and goods of the kind now found
in the world community, ratios of more than ten to one between the richest
and poorest country would eventually prove disruptive, yet such ratios of
disparity exist.2 4 How then can these instances of disruptive disparity be
eliminated? Massive aid financed from resources diverted from arms produc-
tion is one possibility. Other suggestions include plans to speed up the rate
of capital accumulation within the developing societies in order more effec-
tively to allocate domestic resources. These approaches might depend heavily
upon legal process and structure. For one thing, it would be natural to expand
gradually the use of international financial institutions.
A third approach to transition is disarmament. It is the most obvious and,
if feasible, the most satisfactory way to initiate the process of establishing a
warless world. It appears to be even more directly relevant to the solution
of the transition problem than does the ad hoc resolution of particular crises
-even ones of such magnitude as Berlin or Formosa-since it is designed to
eliminate the means of waging major war.
Fourthly, there is the possibility of increasing the responsibility of the
organized world community for the solution of domestic social problems
which might otherwise escalate into cold war crises or accentuate economic
disparities.
Finally, there is the ideal of a centralized legal order functioning as a
governmental center of world affairs. Some development of this kind is an
obvious implication of the other four approaches.
22. Compare the prospects for permanent frustration of the attempts to negotiate a
Berlin or German settlement, or even a stalemate, with the ability to negotiate towards a
stable solution in Korea, Laos, and the Congo.
23. CoMm. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE EuRoPEAN CoMmoN MARKET AND ITS
MEANING TO THE UNITED STATES 77 (1959).
For an analysis of the problems of bringing the poorer nations into the international
system see LAGOS, INTERNATIONAL STRATIFICATION AND UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
(1963).
24. For statistical presentation of existing disparities, see id. at 4-5, 18.
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From among these this article chooses for intensive treatment disarmament
and the possibility of the more responsible use of existing international or-
ganizations. We thus focus initially on the disarmament effort in order to put
into perspective a proposal for implementing the least widely appreciated ap-
proach to transition-international solution of domestic problems in the pre-
violent stages.
IV. THE OUTLOOK FOR COMPREHENSIVE DISARMAMENT
The directness of disarmament explains why advocates of change in the
international system have so often centered their attention upon it as the
single important goal. And both sides in the cold war continually proclaim
that there would be more, not less, security for all national societies if there
were no large scale armaments on either side. Furthermore, there is a wide-
spread awareness of what might be accomplished domestically and in foreign
policy if the burden of armament could be greatly reduced.
Yet it is clear that, except for fleeting periods, neither side has exhibited
much seriousness about the quest for significant disarmament. Nor has either
believed that the other side has.2 5 This conflict between an ideal of a disarmed
world and the practices of nations with respect to it, forces us to single out
the problem for special consideration. For to improve world legal order it is
necessary to exclude the infeasible and emphasize the feasible. How realistic,
then, is disarmament as an approach to the problem of transition?
Disarmament is not impossible, but its prospects, in a system-transforming
as distinct from a system-stabilizing sense,26 are discouraging. Certainly nations
will refuse to disarm altogether at a single stroke. Bitter national rivals find
and possess many reasons not to disarm in the presence of an enemy who will
presumably continue to be an enemy quite far into a disarming world. It is
25. See BARNET, WHO WANTS DISARMAMENT? (1960); BECHHOEFER, PosTwAR
NEGOTIATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL (1961) ; SPANIER & NOGEE, THE POLITICS OF DISAURA-
MENT (1962) ; FORBES, THE STRATEGY OF DISARMAMENT (1962).
26. Cf., e.g., sections on "Measures to Strengthen Arrangements for Keeping the
Peace" in the United States proposals of 1962: BLUEPRINT FOR THE PEACE RACE-
OUTLINE OF BASIC PROVISIONS OF A TREATY ON GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT
IN A PEACEFUL WORLD (April 18, 1962). The disarmament negotiations disclose an in-
sistence upon forms of legal order that are transplanted from domestic legal systems. For
instance, there is evident a reliance upon the International Court of Justice as an indis-
pensable agency for dispute settlement. This is somewhat perplexing because the existence
and retention of the Connally Amendment and our invocation of it in the Interhandel
dispute to withdraw the case from the International Court of Justice suggest the reluctance
of the United States to accept the competence of impartial international institutions,
especially when the subject-matter concerns vital questions. In view of the hasty prepara-
tion of the 1962 outline of basic provisions, one wonders whether there is available a
potential consensus in. support of such far-reaching transfers of competence from national
to international institutions. This feature of the proposals also confronts directly the well-
known Soviet antipathy to the supranational administration of international agreements.
One wonders, therefore, both from the perspective of domestic acceptance and international
negotiability whether this insistence upon supranational judicial machinery is warranted.
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even more unlikely that either major nuclear power would accept the simple
method of unilateral disarmament, even if such voluntary and unsupervised
activity were to be mutually undertaken. This course is advocated by some
Western civilian groups seeking thereby to circumvent the impasse at the
conference table. There is no perceived disposition on the part of mankind,
despite an occasional historical example to the contrary, to rely upon tech-
niques of self-denial and self-imposed limitations in order to reassure or con-
vince a potential enemy of peaceful intentions. Initiative of this type seems
also to ignore the recent lesson on the hazards of appeasement: for to the
extent that the Western democracies sought to convince Hitler of their
commitment to peaceful relations, they tended to accelerate and abet his ag-
gressive designs. With this experience vividly in mind there is no serious
inclination in the West to end the arms race and possibly the cold war by
the unilateral adoption of policies of conciliation.
On the contrary, prevailing elites accept the need to negotiate from a position
of superior strength. This line of response, already deeply engrained in human
tradition and recently reaffirmed by the failure of inter-war policies of ap-
peasement, makes approaches to peace unrealistic, from the perspective of
domestic politics, that do not rest upon programs based on complete and
explicit mutuality.2 7
The prospects for phased disarmament and individual arms control arrange-
ments are also rather disappointing. A piecemeal approach to disarmament
encounters the problems of differential utility in all of their paralyzing com-
plexity. Almost any particular proposal bears unequally upon the military
security of various national actors. It is almost impossible to negotiate mutual
restrictions that are, and are perceived to be, equivalent. Geographical, man-
power, strategic, fiscal, psychological, paramilitary, and intelligence variables
have significantly different weights and characteristics for the two biggest
nuclear nations.23 Even assuming a willingness to negotiate in good faith, these
differences create enormous difficulties in the search for enough common
ground to support a specific arms control or disarmament proposal.
27. For cogent arguments that there is much to be done between the extremes
of unilateralism and a comprehensive disarmament treaty, see ETzioNI, THE HARD WAY
TO PEACE (1962) ; and OSGOOD, ANr ALTERNATIVE TO WAR OR SURRENDER (1962). There
is an essential distinction between these authors who argue in behalf of certain unilateral
initiatives designed to improve the negotiating atmosphere for a transition based upon
mutuality, and those authors who advocate a unilateral program that is carried forward
without regard for the responses of other nations.
28. Does "inspection" serve to deter and identify noncompliance, to protect partici-
pants against the dangers of surprise attack, or to gather targeting information for a
counterforce attack? An absence of consensus about the functions of an inspection sys-
tem helps to account for disagreement at Geneva (betveen governments) and at Wash-
ington (within our own) about how much inspection is needed at various stages of dis-
armament. See generally Verification Response in Disarmament Agreements (Woods
Hole Study), November, 1962.
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The problem of differential utilities is aggravated, of course, by the pre-
vailing patterns of distrust, hostility, and conflict that we group together for
convenience by reference to a "cold war." In practical terms this means that
disarmament negotiations involve hostile bargaining situations in which the
participants are unsatisfied with any agreement that does not strengthen
their relative military position in the cold war. Therefore, the disarmament
situation is one in which the nuclear powers seek to gain relative military
advantages in exchange for reducing or stabilizing absolute military potentials.
It is thus prudence, rather than paranoia or insincerity which leads disarma-
ment negotiators to suspect any agreement that is acceptable to the other
side. If we add this bargaining incentive to the factual intractability of differ-
ential utilities, then frustrating and repeated stalemates are predictable, almost
unavoidable, outcomes in the current world, especially when the stakes are
as high as they are in the disarmament context.
In addition, an arms control or disarmament agreement must generate a
powerful domestic consensus, especially in the United States. Even beyond
the already formidable two-thirds requirement for the ratification of a treaty
by the Senate, lurks the fear that a treaty signed with apparent legislative
support might later generate enough opposition to block its ratification. This
would do grave damage to the image of the United States in world affairs
and might virtually preclude serious disarmament talks for a considerable
period of years. An administration would be prudently reluctant, then, to ac-
cept a treaty at the signatory stage unless it could anticipate a firm 80% level
of legislative support. This surplus of support beyond the constitutional mini-
mum would somewhat insulate the agreement from intervening domestic pres-
sures that might diminish the support that appeared available at the signatory
stage. Comparable difficulties of generating domestic and intra-bloc political
support also seem to interfere with attempts by the Soviet Union to nego-
tiate toward mutually acceptable arrangements.
This high level of difficulty is reached without even questioning the good
faith of the nations professing a commitment to disarmament. And, unhappily,
serious grounds do exist for questioning the reality of even this minimal
assumption. From the Soviet side, disarmament, once operational, might
appear to make it much harder to change the external political status quo
through support of wars of national liberation and instigation of subversive
movements. The Soviet system, apparently, continues to be actuated by dy-
namic revolutionary energy that leads it to assume a missionary role in world
affairs. The use of force has been essential for the transmission of revolutionary
energy across national boundaries by the Sino-Soviet powers in the past.20
29. Cf. KArDELJ, SOCIALISM AND WAR: A SuRvEY OF CHINESE CRrICISM OF THE
PoLcY OF COEXISTENCE (1960) ; ARON, THE CENTUtRY OF TOTAL WAR (1954) ; KINTNER
& KORNFEDER, THE NEW FRONTIER OF WAR (1962). But see Khrushchev, On Peaceful
Co-Existence, 38 FOREIGN AFFAms 1 (1959), where the notion of peaceful competition is
advanced in terms that do not rely upon the use of force to expand one system's ideological
base of power either within or between nations. Other formulations, however, stress the
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Without the possibility of direct and indirect military intervention, the political
balance shifts in favor of the capability of domestic governments to mobilize
the force that they need to maintain internal control.
Another and more sinister way to understand Soviet disarmament policy
is that it may be used as nothing but an instrument of propaganda for appeal
to the non-aligned nations and to peace groups throughout the NATO coun-
tries. Communist leaders have on past occasions manifested a willingness to
exploit peace issues to promote partisan political objectives without any ac-
ceptance of the substantive goals advocated. Thus, for instance, the advocacy
of disarmament and peaceful coexistence may seek primarily to weaken West-
ern alliance and undermine domestic support for anti-Communist governmental
policies, especially those concerned with the defense effort. At the same time
Communist nations would strive to gain the decisive military upperhand in the
arms competition as a prelude to further Sino-Soviet expansions.3 0 For the
attainment of military superiority would facilitate expansion at the geo-political
periphery of the Communist world by the subtle combination of infiltrations,
probes and blackmail. These tactics have already been employed with con-
siderable success during the Krushchev era of Soviet foreign policy. A change
in the military balance would improve greatly the chances for a total Commu-
nist victory without seriously increasing the risks of destructive warfare. It
thus opens up a relatively safe path leading to global domination. From this
perspective, the function of disarmament negotiations is to confuse and weaken
the West and to maintain the tolerance and sympathy of Afro-Asian states.
There is no intention to promote a seriously entertained substantive objective.
Some experts are also suspicious of the Soviet advocacy of disarmament
because disarmament would almost certainly require an opening of Soviet
society. According to this view, the whole controversy about inspection is
properly understood as an expression of the persisting refusal by the Soviet
Union to risk any dilution of the sovereign control exercised by bloc govern-
ments over territory and people. The administration of a disarmament arrange-
ment of any significance would undoubtedly include, if it were to be acceptable
to the West, a considerable amount of intrusion by an international inspec-
torate upon the territory and affairs of participating states. The administration
of disarmament, at least in its more advanced stages, almost certainly would
require the International Disarmament Organization to perform what amounts
to governmental acts in the course of supervising disarmament. Such a claim
of co-sovereignty does appear to contradict the dependence of totalitarian
continuing use of force in just wars of national liberation to promote inter-national
Communist objectives. See, e.g., Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
adopted at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, 48-55, Crosscurrent Press (1961).
30. But see Blackett, Steps Toward Disarmament, Scientific American, April 1962,
p. 45. This would make it difficult to incorporate duties into the domestic law requiring
citizens to report instances of non-compliance to the International Disarmament Organi-
zation. For such a duty gives the supranational organ a claim of allegiance that is para-
mount to that of national institutions.
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societies upon the maintenance of absolute control over the loyalties of the
inhabitants. Thus it is the specific nature of the Communist system, as a
domestic political order, that makes it difficult to conceive Soviet leaders ac-
cepting a disarmament proposal that contains sufficient apparatus to assure
adequate compliance.
The sum of disadvantages of disarmament for the Communist nations seems
rather substantial. However, these disadvantages should be balanced against
the benefits that would result from the reduced prospect of nuclear war and
from the relief that would come with the reduction of defense budgets. It is
difficult to assess with any confidence Soviet attempts to reconcile these con-
flicting sets of considerations. There is probably considerable disagreement
and ambivalence among Soviet leaders, as well as a tendency to shape policy
in reaction to prevailing interpretations of Western disarmament strategy,
intentions, and capabilities.
The West, too, appears to have an ambivalent attitude toward disarmament.
In addition to the various problems of vested interests with respect to the
defense budget, there are the perceived and real dangers of precipitating an
economic depression or producing severe economic dislocations in the course
of implementing disarmament. 31 Furthermore, many important people in the
West construe the Marxist goals of world domination quite literally and
regard deterrent military strength as the main protection of the democratic
West against continuing Communist encroachment. As well, there are some
who regard our anti-totalitarian ideology as an affirmative mission that itself
depends for success upon the availability of superior military strength. Thus,
if it is the task of the West to recover enough dynamism to liberate people
from Communism, especially those living in Eastern Europe, it is essential
to use force or its credible threat. This argument is ideologically less rigorous,
but similar in motivation and structure, to the inverse position taken by the
Chinese Communists. Both ends of the ideological spectrum conceive political
destiny in either/or terms, leading finally to a total victory for one side
or the other.
In addition, the momentum of disarmament would be more difficult to re-
verse in democratic societies. That is, Sino-Soviet rearmament capabilities
would give them an implicit bargaining and intimidation advantage in a dis-
arming world. It seems plausible to suppose that a planned and controlled
economy can make more effective and less disruptive transitions from and to
defense production. Such a prospect has many multilateral ramifications, the
impact upon the effectiveness of the NATO alliance being among the most
significant and obvious. The Western democracies have already in this century
suffered from the momentum of a disarmament-oriented system and they are
31. Cf. Benoit, The Economic Impact of Disarmament in the United States, in Dis-
ARMAMENT: ITS PoLITIcS AND ECONOMICS 134-76 (Melman ed. 1962); Raymond, Prob-
lems of Industrial Conversion; Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament:
Report of the United Nations Secretary-General Transmitting the Study of His Consultive
Group, id. at 332-96.
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chary of adopting such an orientation so long as powerful aggressor states
exist.
It should also be appreciated that no feasible inspection system gives much
promise of detecting significant non-compliance by a potential aggressor in
the final stages of a disarming world.3 2 This is especially so if the potential
violations might be the illicit production of biological and chemical weapons.
These considerations suggest that prospects for general and complete dis-
armament are not sanguine. Pursuit of this goal is, therefore, unrealistic and
even dysfunctional, especially if it involves a tendency to deprecate more
modest transition ventures.
This conclusion is not significantly weakened by the recent limited test ban
treaty. There can be no doubt that the treaty has great potential significance
as a symbol of transition.33 But from a technical point of view it does not do
much to enhance the prospect of world peace. As Secretary Rusk has said,
"All that it does is to eliminate testing in the atmosphere, in outer space, and
under the water. It does not reduce nuclear stockpiles. It does not eliminate
nuclear war or the threat of nuclear war. It does not prevent an arms race." 34
In fact, it may allow subsequent weapon development to benefit from under-
ground testing. Further, the treaty came at a time when many weapons and
strategy experts were dubious about the value of subsequent testing, even
if it were permissible. Hence, the treaty might be regarded as an instrument
which formalizes what the parties would probably have done even in its
absence. Finally, the partial test ban accord requires no special verification
machinery. The exemption of underground testing is a significant indication
of the limits of disarmament at the present stage of international relations.
32. The United States and the Soviet Union each advocate phased disarmament
according to a three-stage plan. The Russian plan seeks to reach the terminal point of
general and complete disarmament within four years. The United States starts slowly,
30% in Stage I, one half of the remaining armaments in Stage II, and final reductions
to police levels in Stage III; also the process is to be carried on over a longer period
of time. Stage I is expected to take three years, Stage II three years, and Stage III, "as
promptly as possible within an agreed period of time." Therefore, although significant
military capability will remain in existence in Stage III, the political system would have
to have been considerably transformed to allow the prior reductions to take place.
33. President Kennedy expressed it well when he said that "Nuclear test ban
negotiations have long been a symbol of East-West disagreement. If this treaty can
also be a symbol-if it can symbolize the end of one era and the beginning of another-
if both sides can by this treaty gain confidence and experience in peaceful collaboration-
then this short and simple treaty may well become an historic mark in man's age-old
pursuit of peace." The attainment of accord on the partial ban was greeted with dramatic
enthusiasm throughout most of the world. It signalizes the extent to which anti-war
sentiments have penetrated human consciousness throughout the world, and are now
available to insist upon and lend support to further disarmament efforts. Address by
President Kennedy, The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: A Step Toward Peace, 49 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 234, 236 (1963).
34. Mr. Rusk and Mr. Harriman Discuss Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 49 DEP'T STATE
BuLL. 240, 241 (1963).
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This skepticism about disarmament suggests that other responses to the
transition question must be examined carefully. For history gives us no con-
fidence that a balancing mechanism of the kind developed by deterrence stra-
tegy is capable of maintaining nuclear peace over a prolonged period of time.
The existing system of international relations, even if it is rather stable, is
intolerably dangerous because of the grave consequences that would attend
a single failure at the strategic level in "the peace system" now relied upon.
Therefore, we regard it as essential, in view of the clouded prospects for
substantial disarmament, to consider alternative or complementary transition
strategies. It is in this light that we advance the proposal for international
solution of domestic problems in pre-violent stages. Since this proposal is
based in part on an interpretation of the legislative quality of recent General
Assembly practice, the legislative character of certain types of UN activity
must be explicated. A warless world would have to find peaceful substitutes
for the legislative role that force and war have played in the history of inter-
national relations. We look upon the General Assembly as developing the
tradition and competence to supply this need for legislation not only with
respect to the control of domestic violence threatening serious international
impacts, already an accepted function, but with respect, as well, to the settle-
ment of domestic social problems that threaten to generate domestic violence
if left unsettled.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR EXTENSION OF THE LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.
Despite the pessimistic outlook for disarmament, the international situation is
not necessarily inhospitable to collective political action designed to reduce
the potentiality for destruction. We have witnessed a certain amount of com-
munity effort to persuade the big nations to end the arms race and negotiate
their differences. General Assembly resolutions condemning United States
and Soviet nuclear test explosions should be understood, at least in part, as
the expression of a judgment premised on the vital need to reduce the level
of cold war tension.
It is true that many situations with potential for contributing to that tension
are now more or less beyond the reach of the United Nations, as a consequence
of the national attitudes which support the rule in article 2, paragraph 7,
forbidding the organization to intervene in matters essentially within the do-
mestic jurisdiction.35 Even if, as is highly unlikely, the restriction of article
35. The exact wording of Article 2(7) is as follows: "Nothing contained in the
present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII." The wording of
this provision strengthens the argument for using the term "intervention" to describe
interference undertaken by the United Nations. There are advantages that come from
maintaining an identity between Charter terminology and scholarly commentary.
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2 (7) was removed as a formal barrier, there is little evidence, as yet, of a
disposition to entrust the United Nations with much authority to impose a
community solution upon an internal conflict unless that conflict produces
sustained domestic violence and intense international concern. On the other
hand, UN practice discloses a willingness to disregard the constraints of 2 (7)
whenever an ardent consensus can be mobilized in the General Assembly. This
is a fruitful area for reflection. For if techniques could be developed to allow
the United Nations to practice precautionary intervention to solve festering
social problems in non-bloc nations, then it might be useful in gradually modi-
fying the belligerent stances assumed by the main nuclear rivals. Solutions
"from above" offer a spectrum of unexplored techniques for arousing national
sentiments that are inclined to favor policies that will not tempt "the enemy"
to push the nuclear attack button.
Baldly stated, the proposal of this article is that if a situation exists within
a domestic society which involves a severe denial of human rights, according
to standards that are formally accepted by the overwhelming majority of states,
and that society is located outside Soviet and American spheres of dominance,3 6
then the world community acting through the United Nations should seek to
impose a solution by a graduated scale of supranational coercion.3 7 This pro-
posal entails action by the United Nations to prevent the escalation of do-
mestic social problems into cold war crises by intervening in domestic arenas
with gradually increasing coercion, as soon as a supporting consensus can be
reached. The proposal entails an expanded scope for United Nations com-
petence in that it would create a duty obliging the United Nations to intervene
whenever domestic social problems appear to two-thirds of the membership
to provide the occasion for local protest -movements successfully to solicit
military involvement on the part of third states.
The presence of social problems is directly relevant to the discovery of an
eventual solution for the transition problem. The argument that underlies
this conclusion can be stated in summary form. Internal instability often arises
when the discrepancy between the subjective expectations and objective ful-
fillment grows large in the new states. Awareness of the discrepancy engenders
internal protest that often grows into violent opposition if the prevailing
governmental elite refuses or is unable to meet the demands for social change
at the proper rate. To make the protesting faction politically effective it is
36. The notion of "dominance" is a relative and variable one. In this context it
refers to all of Europe and Latin America possibly North Africa, parts of the Middle
East, possibly India, and all countries outside of Europe -that are in the Communist
camp. Sphere "outside," then refers to the Afro-Asian uncommitted states. We take
issue with the idea that a state must take sides in the cold war and maintain that those
states that remain outside of the cold war may provide the best situations for supra-
national coercion.
37. There is a direct correlation between domestic repression and international
aggression that makes a severe domestic suppression of human rights a threat to inter-
national peace. Therefore, precautionary intervention can be vindicated as a peace-keeping
measure. The facts in context make such an undertaking more or less persuasive.
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helpful, if'not necessary, to seek external help. The socialist bloc, especially
if the appeal comes from regions that were formerly colonized, is responsive
to such an appeal. To counteract this influence the West may give its support
to incumbent regimes. These offsetting interventions bring the cold war into
domestic politics, and produce intense, if limited, belligerent operations. Once
the stage of belligerency is reached it is difficult to arrive at a satisfactory do-
mestic resolution. It is characteristic of contemporary warfare that violence
is unable to resolve conflict between great powers in any definitive sense. In
fact, military violence leads to armistices rather than genuine peace treaties.
This pattern of local stalemate imitates and is occasioned by the over-arching
nuclear stalemate. Neither bloc, as a rule, obtains for itself or tolerates for
its rival either a complete victory or defeat. The Korean War is a tragic
paradigm.
In designing a rational taxonomy for social problems falling within this
proposal certain distinctions should be taken into account. These distinctions
do no more than refine the awareness of a social problem as a source of wide-
spread discontent. It is useful to distinguish between the delineation of a social
problem that is given by a participant from that given by an observer. There
is a difference between the role and character of social problems in democratic
and totalitarian societies. There is also a difference in role, character, and
mode of response between social problems arising in mature, industrialized
societies, and those arising in newly developing societies or relatively back-
ward societies. Finally there is a crucial distinction between those social prob-
lems that do and those that do not bear upon the perceived issues of the cold
war rivalry.
We must explain the requirement that the domestic arena chosen for in-
tervention be external to the spheres of bloc dominance. It derives from the
fact that a situation with high escalation potential is produced whenever the
threat or the reality of a radical disaffiliation from bloc membership occurs.
The escalation process is accelerated as soon as the bloc leader uses coercion
to discourage or encourage disaffiliation. It is further aggravated in the event
that rival cold war intervention in support of either faction take place. The
process may continue, as it has in Cuba, in the post-disaffiliation stage in order
to retard or punish anew affiliation within the rival bloc. The Western Allies
might have given material aid to help the Hungarian revoluton in 1956 or
the Soviet Union might today urge and assist a Cuban armed attack against
Guantanamo. It is evident that a flock of influential hawks is readily available
in either major power center to demand such action. Nevertheless, the de-
cision in both of these instances has been not to engage in provocative ac-
tivity-because both elite groups acknowledge and defer to the dominant
position of the other in this area.38
38. It is difficult to interpret events in Cuba in the light of this ordering principle.
However, if one regards the failure of the invasion of 1961 at the Bay of Pigs as the
end of the disaffiliation phase, then subsequent participation by the Soviet Union is con-
sistent with superpower deference to intra-bloc interference.
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This reciprocal deference to spheres of influence has some effects which are
not pleasant for either side. Their acceptance of it, however, is based on a
combination of limited capabilities and the normative logic of reciprocity.
Major states are aware that any serious deviation from the present structure
of reciprocity might produce severe and destabilizing retaliations that hardly
seem worth the intrusion, even if successful. This situation is conducive to
the formation of conditions of minimum stability. Its existence, in turn, de-
pends partly upon the advocacy of restraint and the assertion of conscience
by individuals and groups within the nation but outside the formal organiza-
tion of power and authority. Certainly this form of stability would deteriorate
if either bloc were to meddle or intervene by giving a secondary member of
the rival bloc substantial miltiary aid so as to encourage it to extend deviant
behavior to a point of violent disaffiliation. Certain types of behavior by one
bloc in the primary sphere of the other remain permissible. Substantial eco-
nomic and military post-deviation aid to Yugoslavia by the United States or
by the Soviet Union to Cuba have been tolerated. However, adventuresome
intervention policy within the sphere-of-influence of the other major power
is and should be realistically constrained by a sharp awareness of the dangers
of escalation. 39
The world community, acting through the United Nations, has had little
success in intervening in matters of violent intra-bloc conflict. The resolutions
and action of the organization were not susceptible to adequate implementation
precisely because the facts of bloc dominance, considering the meagerness
of available supranational military capabilities, made it futile to claim supra-
national control over the outcome of intra-bloc warfare. So long as the relative
power of the UN is so small, an overwhelming consensus of the world com-
munity must exist if one expects the United Nations to act properly or
effectively. At this stage, it is imperative that the United Nations refrain
from the assertion of claims, the effect of which would be to disturb patterns
of mutual understanding that introduce some stability into cold war competi-
tion. Upsetting patterns of bloc coherence is much more likely to precipitate
a major disaster than is the continuation of open conflicts taking place within
non-aligned nations where cold war competition is mutually tolerated by the
blocs themselves as an aspect of the prevailing mode for both the use and
constraint of violence in the course of political competition.
An example may help to make the proposal of this article more concrete.
The Congo situation was of dimensions sufficiently limited to comply with
our requirements for intervention. An analysis of it may help, in general, to
identify those unsolved social problems where a formal UN commitment is
feasible and where effective curative action, if properly designed, might prove
acceptable to both power blocs.
39. For an interesting normative account of these patterns of reciprocal deference
see McWhinney, Soviet and Western International Law and the Cold War in the Era
of Bipolarity, 1 CAN. Y.B. INT'L LAW 40, 75-81 (1963).
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The Congolese were organized by native groups who felt that Western
imperialism was evil and moribund. Hence, they demanded their freedom and
independence from the Belgian government. Not only did the Belgian gov-
ernment lack the support of significant portions of its own citizenry for con-
tinuing the colonial status of the Congo but its colonial policy was opposed
by many of its allies, the Afro-Asian nations and the socialist bloc. In the
face of this rising tide of opposition, Belgium suddenly acquiesced to the
demands for independence by announcing that it would transfer full sov-
ereignty to a new Congo state administered by native leadership. The transfer
took place on schedule, but severe conflict emerged among internal claimants.
The character of Congolese authority and power was in issue. This produced
an outbreak of civil strife emanating from several nativist centers of aspiration.
Such domestic instability frequently attends a drastic change in the political
status of a community. This is especially so in a community that has not
regularly experienced changes, as contending factions perceive the fluidity
of the period of changeover as a final opportunity to seize power before the
new regime is able to restabilize fully its control. In the Congo these rival
claims were of a character that stimulated cold war antagonists to interfere
in the new state (to some extent by invitation) by a variety of techniques:
advice, technical assistance, diplomatic missions and military equipment. In
addition to the big powers, strong Belgian, British, and Katanganese capital
interests were attempting to shape the new independent Congo. It was under
these circumstances that Patrice Lumumba, the legitimate head of state and
the most popular claimant to the transferred authority, appealed to the Security
Council for assistance. Lumumba requested that the United Nations expel
foreign mercenaries who were characterized as Belgian aggressors and quell
the secessionist movement in Katanga. The Security Council responded affirm-
atively and passed various enabling resolutions insisting that all agents of
foreign governments who had become involved in Congolese strife halt their
activities and, in some cases, leave the country. In addition, the Security
.Council established a United Nations force to help achieve order in the
Congo and to perform normal governmental services. Provisionally, it can
be said that despite internal and international obstacles 40 and a serious lack
of adequate manpower for the tasks undertaken, the United Nations, as an
organization, has been able to operate as the chief stabilizing element in a
situation that has been otherwise highly disorderly, as well as periodically
40. There was an interaction between internal and international obstacles in the
Congo. The internal situation was dominated by a factional struggle for power between
rightist and leftist groups, betveen antagonistic personalities, and between hostile tribes.
This encourages international rivals and diverse political orientations to seek an outcome
within the Congo that would give political control to a sympathetic elite. Whatever choice
the United Nations made, it was necessarily alienating some important nations eager
to combine UN presence with a resolution of the civil war that was favorable to their
interests. For full account, see BtMNs & HEATnCOTE, PEAcE-KEEPING ny U.N. FoRCEs
FROM! SUzZ TO THE CONGO (1963).
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dangerous and destructive. Serious social problems-starvation, disease, un-
employment, genocide, breakdowns of authority relations-existed at the
time of intervention and remain somewhat unresolved. The urgency of these
problems made it rational to assume some risks that seemed to increase the
likelihood of thermonuclear war, the very kind of risks that should not be
normally incurred or tolerated.4 1 In most situations though, the overriding
policy objective normally should be to avoid thermonuclear war, even if such
a commitment may involve sacrificing other values and policies. Only an ex-
ceptional series of threats to human values may justify a particular decision
to increase the dangers of escalation. Nevertheless, in the Congo situation
UN intervention furthered the policy of war avoidance through the reduction
of escalation dangers and the implementation of the kinds of anticipatory
action that attempted to ameliorate, if not solve, a social problem before it
emerged as a cold war crisis.
The elements of "the intervention" by the United Nations in the Congo
are significant. First, the United Nations was initially invited, in fact, urged
to intervene by the state in question. The importance of an "invitation" has
been emphasized, to date, in peace-keeping operations. It has been absent, to
the chagrin of the colonialist states and the Republic of South Africa, in
cases where the organization's "intervention" has stopped short of the use
of force in its narrow military sense. Secondly, an initial unanimity was
present among the "veto" powers in the Security Council. Thirdly, the inter-
vention was expressed in semi-humanitarian terminology; the problem was
not defined by explicit reference to either chapter VI or chapter VII.4 It
was not approached as application of a Charter provision. Rather, it was
treated as the grant of assistance to a former colony that was experiencing
serious difficulties in its attempts to cut the last strands that bound it to a
colonial power. It was thus a matter of helping this new nation to achieve
economic viability and political stability. Fourth, there was ardent support
given by most of the sub-Sahara African members of the United Nations.
This support was expressed by the participation of regional personnel in the
military and policy-making phases of the operation. Fifth, resources existed
to make it plausible to suppose that the claim asserted by the United Nations
on behalf of the world community could be effectively carried out, even in
41. These polar valuations operate in this essay on a candidly hortatory basis. There
is a need to find operationally relevant criteria, e.g., the refusal to threaten nuclear force
to attain any political objective.
42. Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter, comprising Articles 33-38, specifies
the capacity of the Security Council and the General Assembly to work for the pacific
settlement of disputes between states; most of Chapter VI deals with the role of the
Security Council which is given the major responsibility for pacific settlement. Chapter
VII, Articles 39-51, is entitled "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches
of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression," outlines the competence of the Security Council
to engage in peace-keeping activities. Enforcement, as distinct from persuasion, is sup-
posed to be carried on by the Security Council in accord with the provisions found in
Chapter VII.
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the face of maximum opposition from certain quarters. These five considera-
tions-invitation by the constituted government of the strife-torn state, initial
unanimity among the "veto" powers, a convincing humanitarian rationale,
regional participation, and the prospect of effective assertion-provide a set
of criteria that is, in the abstract at least, descriptive of UN practice and of
the preferences of most of its membership.
In the peace-keeping situation the presence of an invitation to intervene by
the constituted govermnent is a significant, although not all-disclosing factor.
To the extent that "intervention" precludes votes of censure and recommen-
dations that members break diplomatic relations or apply economic sanctions,
action without an invitation has been a standard attribute of United Nations
practice. Such "uninvited intervention" was most recently manifested in the
action taken by the organization with respect to Angola and the Republic
of South Africa. 43 There is an important distinction between the relevance
of an invitation to a peace-keeping operation, especially in the context of a
civil war in which an incumbent government with international status exists,
and its irrelevance to action undertaken against an "evil" government, a gov-
ernment that is found to have committed aggression or has been declared
guilty of flagrant abuse of human rights. The two contexts may considerably
overlap in the event that a civil war breaks out in Angola, Rhodesia, or South
Africa.
On the other hand, there have also been significant instances in which
invitations to intervene have been received and the United Nations has failed
or refused to act.44 In many of these situations, the intervention was to have
been predicated upon an application of chapter VI or chapter VII of the
Charter. These situations called for either the threat to use substantial force
against a nation that was powerful within- the theater of conflict or required
the organization to act against the Soviet Union or the United States in a
crisis situation located within a state that was a firm bloc member of one
or the other of these two dominant powers (e.g., Hungary in 1956). The
organization is too weak in independent strength and political will to act
effectively in either type of situation.
Stated more positively, the Congo situation suggests that an invitation
by a non-bloc state to handle a major social problem within its borders, or
an invitation, the acceptance of which can be explained on humanitarian
grounds, presents the kind of situation in which a United Nations intervention
is often already feasible and can be made more so. It is important to suggest
that the social problems which are most relevant to this form of idealized
interaction between a nation and an international organization are those
around which local social protest movements can organize their claims for
43. Earlier instances involve Portugese control of Goa, the domestic political con-
ditions in Spain, and the Dutch withdrawal from Indonesia.
44. E.g., Hyderabad (1954), Guatemala (1954), Hungary (1956), and Cuba (1962-
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support. Some social problems are being handled adequately by the technical
agencies of the United Nations in a relatively depoliticized atmosphere that
is uncontaminated by the cold war. When the organization is able to deal
with social problems on this basis, then it is possible to emphasize solutions
and to subordinate politics. In contrast to the characteristically unpolitical
conduct of many of the technical agencies is the highly political behavior
of the organization whenever a social problem has been perceived and debated
in cold war terms with blocs proposing and demanding lines of solution that
contradict one another. This kind of controversy is not likely to induce effective
action by the Security Council for it will be disadvantageous for one side to
permit international intervention to establish the solution of the other side.
The paralysis that follows when issues are absorbed into the cold war makes
it desirable for the non-aligned states to take the lead by identifying problems
deserving the attention of the organization when it appears likely that the
problems will be otherwise drawn into the cold war struggle if allowed to
smoulder unregulated.
A widespread international consensus is also important for the workability
of this article's proposal. Intervention has already become a major political-
legal undertaking of the United Nations. But the pre-Congo experiences and
the Congo situation itself confirm the impression that the United Nations
is most effective when supported by an overwhelming, cold war-transcending
consensus as was mobilized in whole or part during the operations of the
organization in Indonesia, Israel, Korea, and Suez. In contrast, the United
Nations has been ineffective when this consensus has been absent, as was
the case in Algeria, Hungary, and Tibet. The organization tends to work
effectively whenever the crucial members are committed to a similar although
not identical, attitude toward the proper disposition of a dispute. The prior
establishment of intervention as an effective UN tool does not, however,
trivialize the contribution of this article's proposal for intervention in pre-
violent stages. For, part of the strategy underlying this proposal is to devise
a way of dealing with issues by consensus which, if their internationalization
is postponed, will probably be dealt with later on as an aspect of cold war
conflict. That is, the creation of a United Nations responsibility for the
solution of domestic social problems is a technique for enlarging the opera-
tive scope of international consensus. If this can be done, with even modest
success, it might change considerably the image that each side has of the
other by bringing to light those things about which all major states can agree.
This will correct the impressions gained by a concentration, so exclusive as
to be almost obsessive, by cold war rivals upon issues of discord and dissensus.
Thus it would be a significant contribution both to solving the transition
problem and safeguarding peace in the existing system of international rela-
tions if the United Nations can reflect a cooperative approach to a domestic
problem, which, if allowed to remain unattended, would generate insurgent
violence that could be transposed into an occasion for cold war confrontation.
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A third characteristic of the proposal is the stress it lays on the relation
between the promotion of human rights and the preservation of international
peace. Thus, the United Nations should not usually help an "evil" incumbent
government suppress domestic social protest, even if the insurgency receives
some foreign encouragement and support. In fact, by allowing its machinery
to be used for a set of actions that ascend from discussion through censure
to diplomatic and economic sanctions and, finally, to military sanctions, the
United Nations puts itself gradually in the position of legitimizing domestic
insurgency. It is not the elimination of domestic violence that will help safe-
guard the peace, but the cause of peace can be helped by the prior satisfaction
of grievances that can find no other solution but violence. Timing is exceed-
ingly important-to intervene before the domestic conflict has been polarized
along cold war lines and to coerce a solution that expresses a non-political
judgment based upon the universal commitment to the equality of people
regardless of race, nationality, gender, or religion. Fostering these goals may
occasion violence in certain societies, say Southern Rhodesia or the Republic
of South Africa. But this proposal assumes that violence sponsored by the
organized community will, in general, although not in each particular case,
be less dangerous than allowing the domestic conflict to run its natural
course, often culminating in insurgent recourse to protracted violence and
terror abetted by foreign intervention. 45 However desirable the potential of
UN intervention into domestic problems at pre-violent stages may be, the
success of this proposal requires the serious acceptance of an extension of
function and competence of some UN agency. This extension can be achieved
by a variety of methods. One approach is to revise the Charter. This is so
hard to accomplish that it can be dismissed as politically unattractive.
Another mode of extension is the gradual evolution of practice by deliberate
interpretations of the existing mandate to act. A third mode of extension
relies on developing further trends already revealed in the practice of the
General Assembly.46 This third approach would seem to have great merit.
To begin with, no potential vote is involved. Furthermore, the General As-
45. It should be noted that a distinction exists between the relevance of nuclear war
to unsolved domestic social problems for which the United Nations intervention is recom-
mended and political violence that is carried on across international boundaries. For
social problems it may be necessary to initiate violence with a low escalation potential
so as to cut down on the prospect of subsequent intrastate violence with an increased
escalation potential. This is the basis for recommending coercive intervention in the
affairs of Angola, Rhodesia, and the Republic of South Africa. In contrast, if the violence
is of interstate proportions then the escalation factor is already too high and the United
Nations should be used, to the extent that it is politically possible to help the victim
state restore the status quo ante. Nuclear peace and the frustration of aggression remain
dominant ordering considerations. A full argument is made in FALK, LAW, WAR, AND
MORALITY IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 42-65 (1963).
46. This interpretation of practice is also supported, although indirectly and not un-
ambiguously, by the view of the majority in the advisory opinion of the International
Court of justice in. the case of Certain Expenses of United Nations, [1962] I.CJ. Rep.
151, 163-75 (advisory opinion).
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sembly, since it operates in certain respects as a legislative body, would be a
natural place in which to experiment with a proposal which makes an attempt
to extend the legislative reach of the United Nations. There are, however,
disadvantages. Since the Charter seems to restrict its function to the making
of recommendations, any assumption of legislative power by the General
Assembly rests on shaky foundations. True, if there is a sufficient consensus
behind a General Assembly recommendation, its decision begins to embody
the qualities of legislation. Indeed, that has been the tone of General Assembly
practice in recent years. Nevertheless, despite the growth in practice of
General Assembly power, charter limitations hamper the explicit assumption
of the legislative competence required for the implementation of this article's
proposal. Even UN interventionary claims made so far have encouraged an
attitude of disrespect for the Charter as the organic law of that organization
and have deprived minority members of juridical protection. It may be pos-
sible eventually to use the broader, more constitutionally based authority of
the Security Council, at least when a consensus among the veto powers exists.
However, despite its drawbacks as a political institution, the General Assembly
contains the only real legislative constituency-the Afro-Asian bloc-in the
organization. One must conclude that the Assembly has the more genuine
basis for and tradition of rendering world community judgments. A wide
endorsement from the Assembly of a United Nations intervention more prob-
ably assures continuing political support for the organization's activities than
does a show of temporary unity in the Security Council.
VI. AN AssESSMENT
Beginning with a recognition of the difficulties that attend the effort to
establish a stable peace system for the conduct of international relations, this
article has tried to develop a proposal that will contribute partially and in-
directly to the solution of the transition problem. This proposal argues for
the gradual expansion of the legislative functions 4 assumed by international
47. The emphasis of this proposal is upon the creation of an effective legislative
competence for the United Nations in the social policy field. It is legislative in the sense
that it enables a consensus of the General Assembly to undertake a program of social
and political ciange in a state, thereby altering its domestic legal order. It is not legis-
lative in the sense of generating new fundamental norms, but it is legislative to the degree
that it creates norms intermediate between the broad Charter directives (Preamble,
Articles 1, 2, and 55) and the specific policy that is to be executed in a particular
situation (e.g., decolonialization, racial equality). There is an ad hoc quality to this
variety of legislative activity, for we have in mind a series of intermediate norms de-
veloped to meet a series of domestic situations rather than the enactment of "a law" that
can be used by executive officers (the Secretariat) to handle all recurring problems in
the area. The notion of legislation, like the idea of law itself, should not be transferred
from the domestic political environment without due regard for the distinctive character
of the United Nations. Our proposal constitutes our understanding of the functional
character of "legislation" in the United Nations context. For a preliminary attempt to
develop these ideas see Falk, The Legitimacy of Legislative Intervention by the United
Nations, in Essays on Intervention and International Law (to be published by the Ohio
State University Press).
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institutions organized on a regional and global basis. It encourages interna-
tional organizations, subject to limitations and safeguards, to intervene in
domestic conflicts that have assumed or threatened to assume violent pro-
portions.
The proposal arises in the first instance from the plausibility that a nuclear
war will escalate out of a local conflict and from the tendency of cold war
rivals to commit themselves to securing sympathetic resolution of domestic
struggles for national dominance. The United Nations has received from its
members a particularly broad grant of authority to do what is necessary to
maintain international peace and security. This mandate takes precedence
over all complementary policies and rules, and especially the policy against
displacing the norms of domestic jurisdiction which exist to insulate national
realms of activity from outside interference. Stated in simplest form, the
proposal is a proposition: whenever peace is endangered, United Nations
intervention is justified. As such, this is a commonplace. The novelty of the
proposal is its broader view of danger to international peace-that domestic
social problems, even at a previolence stage, are a sufficient danger to inter-
national peace to warrant United Nations intervention, whether or not this
intervention requires a disregard of traditional sovereign prerogatives. There
is little doubt that if this proposal achieves any operational significance in the
practice of the United Nations, it will be a radical, if somewhat disguised
step toward world government. For the consequence is to centralize governing
competence for the formation of controversial domestic policy in international
institutions. This involves a considerable reallocation of competence and
authority between national and supranational decision-makers that might
have a significant influence upon the willingness of elites to substitute for
exclusive national values and goals those of a genuine world commuunity.
There are, however, several shortcomings of an approach to international
order that relies upon legislative intervention by supranational institutions.
First of all, there is the danger that a moral solution proposed outside the
relevant national community will harden patterns of adherence within the
community. Certainly this seems to have been the case in South Africa and
Angola. The long struggle of the South against the grant of real equality
to the Negro is also partly a refusal to accept a solution devised by and dic-
tated from the North. Moral revitalization depends ultimately upon the pro-
cesses of inner transformation. It is this style of argument that seems to be
such a persuasive rebuff to those who wish to roll back forcibly the Communist
empire to the boundaries of the Soviet Union. It is also the most promising
mode of liberalization for the various Communist regimes. There are severe
dangers of a moral variety that attend any undertaking that depends upon
an external coercive animus. However, these dangers must be viewed in the
tragic context of choice, itself heavily conditioned by the paramount need
to reduce the dangers of war, strife and unrest.
Second, there are serious questions of feasibility. We are proposing co-
operative action on matters of crucial political and social concern by national
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rivals that are deeply divided as to the proper way for the world to be run
and organized. Non-bloc participants are often bloodthirsty, irresponsible, and
highly provincial in outlook. Their outlook is conditioned by a very old-
fashioned pursuit of national interests and not by a sense of a moral mission
to build a community. Furthermore, serious abuses of human rights and
fundamental problems of social discontent exist within the Sino-Soviet bloc.
These must be systematically overlooked, at least to the extent that a UN
response requires censure of and coercion against the existing regimes.
Intra-bloc problems can not often be usefully raised on a supranational
level at this stage. The political motivation is too high and the prospects for
a meaningful supranational response are almost nil. Even so, the debates on
Hungary and Cuba in the United Nations may have served as marginal re-
straints upon policymakers in the United States and the Soviet Union, leading
to the eventual adoption of a moderate course. Supranational consensus is
not easy to form with respect even to situations outside the blocs. Even if
agreement exists on the highest level of abstraction, it often disappears when
it comes to devising a scheme for implementation. Competing national and
ideological perspectives present themselves when implementation issues are
raised. The Congo operation discloses the extent to which common objectives
do not assure the presence of a common interest to sustain their attainment.
There are various ways to topple colonialism. The United States prefers
the emergence of a moderate, democratically inclined government, affiliated
with the West, and tender toward its past. The Sino-Soviets prefer, more or
less, the obverse. If we qualify the proposal by requirements of incumbent
consent and inter-bloc consensus, then it may not often prove feasible to
agree on the standard that should govern specific supranational interventions.
Third, the principles that support supranational intervention by global or
quasi-universal institutions are much more problematic with respect to regional
intervention. Often regional communities act to discourage or penalize hetero-
geneous political developments. One thinks of the regional pressure available
to coerce Israel, Formosa, and Cuba. In each instance what is incompatible
with the regional consensus is compatible with the minimum requirements
for participation in a universal organization; this contrasts somewhat with the
relevance of regional pressure against the Republic of South Africa, which is
confirmed by a global consensus.
Fourth, a proposal of this sort requires states to subordinate national per-
spectives to the desiderata of world community welfare. This is somewhat
utopian as long as international organizations are predominantly perceived as
institutions that are useful means to reach national ends. Members are not
significantly free to adopt an outlook and program that is an optimal com-
munity response to social problems.
Despite these substantial obstacles, our conclusion is that the advocacy of
increasing legislative competence for supranational, especially universal, in-
stitutions is beneficial. It promotes a recognition of the connection between
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an international welfare system and the transition to a warless world. This
kind of awareness might help to generate the kind of expectations that would
support our objective of moving beyond a primary reliance upon the nation
for security and welfare. It is high time that we confront their rationality of
an inertial approach to world order with a radical rationality more appro-
priate to the urgencies of the age. This proposal is submitted as a hesitant
first step to find the obscure path of radical rationality.
